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BOOK REVIEW
Gideon Yaffee, Manifest Activity: Thomas Reid’s Theory of
Action. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004, 158 pp.,
$52.00 hardcover
Gideon Yaffee’s Manifest Activity is an important contribution to both
the studies of Thomas Reid’s views and action theory. Reid is known as an
early advocate of an agent-causal view of free will; more recent advocates
include Roderick Chisholm. Manifest Activity is a well-appreciated effort at
bringing Reid’s particular version of agent-causalism and his arguments for
it into the contemporary discussion. Manifest Activity should be of interest
to Reid scholars, action theorists, and anyone who wants to explore a focused, critical analysis of a fascinating thinker.
Yaffee’s writing is clear and readable, yet rigorous and detailed. Yaffee’s
aim in each chapter is clearly laid out, and the structure of each is clear.
Some chapters start out with a reconstruction of one of Reid’s argument,
and then Yaffee assesses each of the premises in turn. Other chapters begin
with an interpretive puzzle, which Yaffee solves with resources from the
Reid corpus. At times, the dialectic gets complex, but concise summaries
that tie the arguments together are a welcome end of each chapter. Skipping
the footnotes is not recommended, as they often contain significant reflections, extensions, or qualifications of points in the main text, if not important references to historical and contemporary texts.
In his introduction, Yaffee writes that Reid takes himself to be following the methods of Newton, according to which ‘‘the primary aim of scientific inquiry is the identification of first principles’’ such as the law of
universal gravitation (p. 3). Mathematical, empirical, and philosophical
inquiries all have the same structure and the same goal, and first principles are all similar in certain respects. Quoting Reid, Yaffee states that the
only support for first principles is ‘‘that, by the constitution of our nature,
we are under a necessity of assenting to them. Such principles are parts
of our constitution’’ (p. 4). However, so-called first principles seem like a
very mixed lot, and it does not seem like our constitution puts us under a
necessity of assenting to basic laws of nature. Yaffee seems aware of this,
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mentioning in a footnote ‘‘it might seem strange to claim that for him the
basic laws of nature are first principles. After all, basic laws are not always
dictated by common sense’’ (p. 3). Yaffee’s only reply to this strangeness
is that basic laws of nature like the law of universal gravitation are Reid’s
favorite examples of the first principles of contingent truths. While Yaffee
gives textual support for his interpretation of Reid, he never questions the
plausibility of the view itself. Yet it is not clear that basic laws of nature
from which particular facts follow are principles that we are compelled to
believe, rather than elusive a posteriori truths about the world.
The terminology that Yaffee introduces in his introduction is crucial
to understanding his discussion of Reid’s views. A ‘‘cause in the physical sense’’ is something which, by the laws of nature, the effect always
follows, ‘‘laws of nature’’ being rules according to which the effects are
produced (p. 6). An ‘‘efficient cause’’ is an entity endowed with active
power to produce an effect, or the originator of a sequence of events. A
‘‘power’’ is a quality possessed by the entity from which change flows (p.
7). With such terms in mind, Reid’s thesis can be put: Actions of an agent
are events of which the agent is the efficient cause.
In chapter 1, Yaffee considers Reid’s argument from the power to exert
for the claim that will and understanding are necessary for active power.
According to Reid, the only real causes are not mere instances of regularities, but efficient causes, which all have minds. Following Reid, Yaffee asserts that this claim follows from three natural beliefs, and that the contrary
position according to which mindless objects have active power ‘‘is shown,
by Reid’s argument, to be unstable’’ (p. 37). Yaffee seems to be endorsing
Reid’s argument and conclusion, which he interprets as follows: an agent
has a power only if she has the power to exert it; an agent has the power
to exert only if she has a will; an agent has a will only if she has an understanding; therefore, an agent has power only if she has a will and an understanding. Yaffee tries to motivate support for the first premise by looking
at Reid’s criticisms of Thomas Hobbes’s conception of power, according to
which an agent has a power to act if and only if, if she chooses to act, then
she acts. Reid’s criticism of Hobbes’s conception of power is a variant of a
standard criticism of compatibilism: that an action cannot be in the agent’s
power if the choice to perform that action is not also within his power. This
criticism suggests that an agent has the power to perform an action only if
the agent in question has the power to choose to perform the action, which
may be some reason for believing the first premise of the argument.
Perhaps Yaffee shows that Reid’s criticism of Hobbes supports the first
premise of the argument from the power to exert or that Reid’s particular
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variant is an improvement on the standard criticism. However, whether
Hobbes’s conception of power or his critic’s conception of power is correct, both of them suppose that the entity with power is an agent, capable
of making choices. Yaffee’s aim is to show that Reid shows that there is no
power without a mind. But the defense of the first premise of the argument
from the power to exert considered by Yaffee presupposes that the power
in question is that of an agent. Showing that one conception of what it is
for an agent to have power is superior to another conception of what it is
for an agent to have power does not go towards showing that only agents
can have power. Furthermore, Reid uses the term ‘‘exertion’’ to refer to the
feeling of effort. Consequently, the first premise of the argument from the
power to exert is based on the assumption that a thing with power experiences a feeling, which is question begging in the context of an argument
against the claim that mindless entities can have power.
The argument for the second premise of the argument from the power
to exert, which we can call the conceivability argument, raises similar concerns. Yaffee’s construction of the conceivability argument proceeds as
follows: our only conception of exertion derives from the consciousness of
our own exertions; all of our own exertions are volitions; we are unable to
conceive of intellectual powers different in kind from the powers we possess; an active power would be different in kind from those we possess if
the exertion of it did not consist in volition; there are no active powers different in kind from those which we are able to conceive; therefore, all exertions of active power are volitions.
Let us consider the third premise of the conceivability argument, that we
are unable to conceive of intellectual powers different in kind from those
we possess. Again, the contrast is between our intellectual powers and a
different kind of intellectual power. If ‘‘intellectual’’ is used in a sense that
does not presuppose a mind, that sense is not mentioned. What is inconceivable, according to the premise, is a different kind of intellectual power,
not a non-intellectual power. The possibility of something without a mind
having power is not directly considered, let alone refuted.
Yaffee writes that the first, fourth, and fifth premises of the conceivability argument are relatively unproblematic and gives them little discussion. He says that the first premise of the conceivability argument is an
upshot of David Hume’s lesson about causation, that we never perceive
power, only constant conjunctions between types of events. What Yaffee
fails to note is that Hume explicitly rejects the view that we can derive a
conception of power from our own exertions. There too, we observe only
constant conjunctions, in this case of feelings of exertion and bodily move-
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ments. Yaffee says nothing of Hume’s direct challenge to Reid’s view of
manifest activity.
Yaffee finds support for the fifth premise of the conceivability argument,
that there are no active powers different in kind from those we are able to
conceive, in Reid’s view that inconceivability implies impossibility. According to Reid, things which people are, by nature, incapable of conceiving are
impossible. However, regardless of Reid’s endorsement, the fifth premise of
the conceivability argument and the principle supporting it are not unproblematic. As Thomas Nagel argues, perhaps we cannot conceive of what it is
like to navigate through the world with echolocation. However, it would be
wrong to conclude that it is impossible for a creature to navigate through
the world with echolocation. Our inability to conceive of space as having
other than three dimensions does not show that string theory could not possibly be true. Yet possibly, such phenomena are things, which our nature as
human beings excludes us from being able to conceive.
Yaffee suggests that there is some evidence that Reid’s argument for second premise of the argument from the power to exert is rooted in thoughts
about the inherently subjective nature of mental experience. Arguably, we
cannot know what the subjective experiences of others are like. We only
know the nature of experiences we have had, and know nothing of the nature of unfamiliar experiences. If unfamiliar experiences are inconceivable,
and the inconceivable is impossible, then unfamiliar experiences are impossible. By parity of reasoning, we cannot know what it is like not to have experience at all. We cannot experience non-experience. Perhaps Reid’s argument is that since we know what it is like to efficiently cause something,
and we cannot know what it is like to be a mindless object efficiently causing something, mindless objects cannot be efficient causes. However, if the
conceivability argument proves anything, it proves too much. We know
what it feels like to fall. We cannot know what it feels like to be a falling
stone. But such necessary ignorance does not show that stones cannot fall.
Perhaps Reid’s argument, as Yaffee interprets it, could be restated be
saying that: we have an idea of efficient causation; the source of this idea
was either external events or our own volitions; external events could not
have been the source of our idea; therefore, the source of our idea of efficient causation was our own volitions; our conception of our own volitions essentially includes subjective experience of exertion; therefore,
our idea of efficient causation essentially includes the subjective experience of exertion. A subjective experience of exertion requires will and understanding. If successful, this argument supports the conclusion that our
idea of efficient causation is of something that requires will and understanding. It falls short of showing that efficient causation requires will and
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understanding. A relation between entities in the world might not be constrained by our ability to conceive of them. Furthermore, it is not clear
that our ability to conceive of efficient causation be so constrained, and
that the content and applicability of an idea must be limited by its source.
If the source of our idea of efficient causation is our own volitions, we can
extrapolate from that, leaving out the subjective, intellectual part, and applying the concept to inanimate matter.
In chapter 2, Yaffee explores a different argument for the claim that efficient causes must have will and understanding: the argument from the
power to do otherwise. According to the argument from the power to do
otherwise, power to perform and action requires the power not to perform that action, and that requires a will. The major premise of the argument from the power to do otherwise is that, if an agent has the power to
perform an action, then she has the power not to perform it. This premise is defended against Locke’s counterexample of a man who freely stays
in a room, unaware that he could not leave if he wanted to. The reply is
roughly that, even in this case, the person has the power to try to perform
the action.
In the case of persons, the premise that an agent with a power to act
has a power not to act has some plausibility. However, this premise does
not seem to apply to mindless things. For example, acid does not have the
power to not turn litmus paper pink. But that does seem to support the
claim that acid does not have the power to turn litmus paper pink. Again,
Yaffee considers a debate over the powers of agents, and the possibility of
mindless power does not enter the discussion. This absence is odd, since
this is just this possibility, which is supposed to be refuted in chapters 1
and 2. Perhaps there is some kind of first cause argument that supports
the idea that only agents can originate event sequences, that is, be efficient
causes. Perhaps the idea of a mindless event or object originating a sequence of events is incoherent. But those arguments are not found in Manifest Activity.
In chapter 3, Yaffee argues that Reid shows that all events are efficiently
caused; that every event is brought about by an entity with active power.
These events include human actions, efficiently caused by people, and natural events, efficiently caused by God. Yaffee does not question Reid’s view
that events, which are physically caused, that is, which happen in accordance with a law, are efficiently caused by the author of that law. Yet Yaffee
notes that Reid acknowledges that it is one thing operate in accordance with
laws and another thing to be caused. It follows that it is one thing to set up
the laws, and another to initiate the events, which occur in accordance with
those laws. If a pawn moves a space during a chess game, the author of
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the rules of chess seems like a distant causal factor at best, rather than the
power behind that move. Part of Reid’s view discussed by Yaffee in chapter 3 is that all events serve the ends of some creature. Either people are acting to serve their own ends, or God set up the laws to serve the ends of His
creation. Central to this picture is a belief in divine providence. Yaffee never
defends this belief, nor offers an argument for the existence of God, which
is necessary to support Reid’s causal picture of the world. It is fine to place
Reid’s views in the context in which they were offered, consistent with his
larger belief system. However, it is less clear what these arguments have to
offer people with secular world views.
In chapter 4, Yaffee considers Reid’s argument for the claim that human
beings are efficient causes of their actions that derives from the observation
that people make and execute plans. To make and execute plans, an individual must adopt a principle of behavior, and act in accordance with it. Being the author of the rule he follows, an agent is an efficient cause of his behavior. However, this argument rests on the same questionable principle
which shows God to be the efficient cause of all physically caused events:
that the author of a rule is the cause of events which happen in accordance
with the rule.
In chapters 5 and 6, Yaffee provides responses to the view that people do
not cause actions, but motives do. In chapter 5, Yaffee addresses Reid’s argument against the view that motives are efficient causes of action. Reid’s
argument is roughly that: a motive is a state of affairs that an action is aiming towards; typically, if that state of affairs ever exists, it does not exist until after the agent performs the action; something that does not exist when
the event occurs cannot be the efficient cause of that event; therefore, motives are not efficient causes of actions.
A proponent of the view that motives efficiently cause actions could reject Reid’s definition of motives as states of affairs that actions are aiming
toward and instead claim motives are prior thoughts about such states of
affairs. Beyond the linguistic issue, an adversary of Reid’s could restate his
view as: thoughts about the end in virtue of which an action is performed
are the efficient causes of actions. Furthermore, it is not clear why Reid does
not use the resources Yaffee discusses in the first two chapters of Manifest
Activity for a quicker and more intuitive argument against the view that
motives cause actions. If Reid has indeed shown that an efficient cause
must have will and understanding, a motive, construed either as an end or
a thought about that end, is not the sort of thing that could be an efficient
cause. If the arguments in chapters 1 and 2 are correct, there is no need to
delve into the obscure discussion about the non-existence of abstract entities we find in chapter 5.
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In chapter 6, Yaffee discusses Reid’s arguments for the claim that motives are not among the physical causes of human action; that there are no
laws of nature covering motives and human actions. The first argument,
that there is no non-trivial yet accurate way to specify any laws governing
human behavior, comprises perhaps the most interesting and well-argued
part of Manifest Activity, and is well worth reading for anyone concerned
with action theory, free will, or the like. Reid also argues that motives are
not necessary for actions, and that the influence of a motive is like the influence of advice, and both are unlike the influence of physical causes. Here,
Reid adopts the view that motives are thoughts about ends, not the ends
themselves. Reid’s view is more subtle than Yaffee originally states. There
are laws that govern some human actions, since a person who exhibits a
character trait acts in accordance with a rule. It is more correct to say that,
on Reid’s view, the only laws governing an agent’s behavior are the laws
that the agent legislates.
In his concluding chapter, Yaffee defends the position that Reid is an agent
causalist who maintains that there is a basic causal relation between agents
and events. Some philosophers might hold this position to stop an infinite
regress of acts. If an agent’s overt behavior was caused by some prior event
of the agent’s making an effort, and that event was caused by the agent trying to act, which was in turn caused by some previous state, and that chain of
events will extend back, prior to the history of the agent, or stop somewhere,
not at an event, but at the agent herself. However, according to Yaffee, Reid
equates an agent’s trying with the agent’s doing, in the case where the agent
successfully acts. However, in the case where the agent fails to carry out her
intended action, the agent merely tried, but did not do.
To assess this view, let us consider the man who wants to exit a room
and does. His trying to leave the room is the same act as his leaving the
room. Let us also consider a perfect duplicate of the man who wants to exit
the room, but is blocked at the last minute by invisible bars. The duplicate
has the same intentions and performs the same bodily movements as the
man who successfully exits the room. Their tryings are perfectly similar,
but the duplicate’s trying is not also a doing. It seems to follow from Reid’s
view, as Yaffee interprets it, that two instances of behavior could be intrinsic duplicates, but differ with respect to whether they are doings.
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